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E D I T O R I A L
What is “moral distress” in nursing? How, can and should we
respond to it?
Interest in moral distress (MD) as a research topic has soared in
recent years. What is it about this concept that makes it so intrigu-
ing? Why does it create such debate amongst healthcare profession-
als? Why has there been so much conceptual confusion regarding
the concept? And why do nurses, in particular, seem to feel this con-
cept so accurately captures their experiences? These are some of
the questions that I have been thinking about over the course of my
doctoral studies and I would like to consider here.
As it was originally conceived, MD was believed to arise “when
one knows the right thing to do, but institutional constraints make it
nearly impossible to pursue the right course of action” (Jameton,
1984, p. 6). On this understanding, all that is required for MD to
occur is a moral judgement and the presence of an external con-
straint which prevents that judgement from being carried out. This
notion that nurses are constrained by external forces and are “not
free to be moral” (Yarling & McElmurry, 1986, p. 63) has according
to critics, such as Paley (2004), perpetuated a favourite metanarra-
tive of nurses suffering within nursing discourse. Others, such as
Johnstone and Hutchinson (2015), argue that the entire concept
ought to be abandoned because it undermines the process of moral
deliberation by perpetuating the notion that nurses’ moral judge-
ments are correct and justified. They argue that MD, as it is cur-
rently understood (according to Jameton (1984, 1993)), risks nurses
failing to nurture the skills required for ethical discussion and dam-
ages their integration into moral decision-making because of the “as-
sumed rightness of [their] moral judgements” (Johnstone and
Hutchinson, 2015). Indeed, Weinberg (2009) highlights how Jame-
ton’s conception of MD fails to acknowledge the possibility that
there might not even be a “correct” course of action. So, does Jame-
ton’s (1984) conception of MD perpetuate epistemic arrogance, or
worse perhaps, epistemic laziness, when it comes to decision-mak-
ing? Should we, as Johnstone and Hutchinson (2015) argue, abandon
the concept of MD altogether?
Despite criticism of the concept, the notion of MD continues to
attract research attention from healthcare professionals and, in par-
ticular, nurses, suggesting that it appeals to individuals lived experi-
ences. I was first drawn to exploration of this phenomenon through
my own experiences working as a nurse in the National Health Ser-
vice (NHS). I was surprised to find a distinct lack of empirical
research had been conducted in the United Kingdom (UK). Since
Jameton (1984) first defined MD, hundreds of qualitative,
quantitative and theoretical studies exploring MD have been pub-
lished, but very few are from the UK. In a recent review of this lit-
erature, Morley et al. (2017) identified twenty key definitions from
the extensive MD literature, each made up of various necessary
and/or sufficient conditions required for MD to occur (Morley, Ives,
Bradbury-Jones, & Irvine, 2017). However, a lack of engagement
within the empirical literature with these various suggested defini-
tions of MD has caused conceptual confusion which has complicated
attempts to study the phenomenon. For example, there are many
studies which purport to measure MD using variations of the Moral
Distress Scale, one of the most commonly used measures of MD,
but many of these studies use different definitions of MD to under-
pin their research which makes comparisons between studies prob-
lematic. The first aim of my research project was therefore to
establish a definition of MD that was plausible within the UK set-
ting. As with other recent theoretical efforts, I argue that Jameton’s
(1984) original definition of MD needs to be broadened and postu-
lated a definition that comprises three core criteria:
1. the experience of a moral event,
2. the experience of “psychological distress”, and
3. a direct causal relation between (1) and (2).
This much broader understanding of MD allows for other poten-
tially relevant causes of MD to be captured within the “umbrella”
term of MD (McCarthy & Deady, 2008), which can then be further
subcategorised, as suggested by Fourie (2015), into, for example,
“moral-constraint distress” or “moral-conflict distress.” I hypothesize
that broadening the definition of MD and subcategorising into these
constituent pieces will allow for more specific measurements and
targeted interventions to help address MD.
Arguably, only once the conceptual fog has cleared can health-
care professionals, researchers and policy-makers can begin to gain
further clarity regarding what, if anything, can be done to mitigate
MD? Indeed, it has been suggested that MD is simply a natural
response to morally troubling experiences that should be welcomed
and that getting rid of MD is not only impossible but undesirable
(personal communication with Tigard; hinted at in Tigard (2017) and
Howe (2017)). MD may be a natural consequence of the messiness
of moral life but when one experiences MD everyday due to their
occupation, which seems to be the case for nurses and other
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healthcare professionals, then it may instead be regarded as an occu-
pational hazard that employers have a responsibility to address. Mar-
shall and Epstein (2016) argue that MD is inherently linked to the
notion of “moral hazard” because of the power differentials between
those making the decisions and those that must live with those deci-
sions. Moral hazard is a term used to describe situations in which
one party controls decisions about resources but another party bears
the burden of those decisions (Brunnquell & Michaelson, 2016).
Many nurses are in the position of bearing responsibility for enacting
the decisions of their medical colleagues and seem most likely to risk
experiencing the moral hazard that is MD. We need, therefore, to
pay more attention to nurse’s working environments and their
potentially negative ramifications. The links between MD and the
work environment are becoming increasingly well documented.
Much of the empirical research exploring MD in North America has
cautioned that higher levels of MD are often correlated with poorer
perceived ethical climate (Hamric & Blackhall, 2007; Hamric, Borch-
ers, & Epstein, 2012; Silen, Svantesson, Kjellstr€om, Sidenvall, &
Christensson, 2011) and intention to leave the workplace (Corley,
Minick, Elswick, & Jacobs, 2005; Whitehead, Herbertson, Hamric,
Epstein, & Fisher, 2014) Additionally, MD appears to be correlated
with other experiences that have similar affects such as compassion
fatigue and burnout (Maiden, Georges, & Connelly, 2011; Rushton,
Batcheller, Schroeder, & Donohue, 2015).
Even if we perceive MD to be a natural response to morally
challenging events, the negative consequences that MD appears to
have upon the nursing profession (perpetuating the nursing shortage
as increasing numbers of nurses leave the profession, psychological
distress and distancing oneself from patients) suggest we should
consider ways to respond to it. MD seems to consist of two funda-
mental aspects: psychological distress and a moral event. We might,
therefore, need different interventions to tackle each of these
aspects. There are several mechanisms in place that can be further
utilized and integrated into everyday clinical practice that may help
address psychological distress, for example regular team debriefing
sessions after patients' deaths or clinical incidents, and addressing
the stigma around using staff support services such as employee
assistance programmes that are available at most NHS Trusts. In a
recent longitudinal study, Maben et al. (2018) explored the effective-
ness of Schwartz Rounds which offer a safe space for staff to come
together and reflect upon the experiences and challenges they face
at work. They found that attending Schwartz Rounds resulted in a
statistically significant improvement in staff psychological well-being,
increased empathy and compassion for patients and colleagues, and
positive changes in practice (Maben et al., 2018).
For other possible responses to MD, we can look to North Amer-
ica, where much of the initial MD research has been conducted and
initial interventions tested. For example, Cynda Rushton, Professor of
Clinical Ethics, Johns Hopkins University, has developed a Mindful
Ethical Practice and Resilience Academy (MEPRA) based upon her
work exploring moral resilience as a possible response to MD (Rush-
ton, Caldwell, & Kurtz, 2016). Elsewhere in the USA, Helft, Bledsoe,
Hancock, and Wocial (2009) have explored facilitated ethics
conversations as a response to MD and Hamric & Epstein (2017)
have launched a systemwide MD consultation service. In the UK,
Traynor (2017) has explored the concept of “critical resilience” not as
a specific response to MD but rather as a way for nurses to look
more critically at their environments. Traynor (2017) argues that by
examining and revealing the power structures in which we work,
nurses can come together in solidarity and resist the external forces
that Morley and Jackson (2017) suggest are destroying the art of
nursing. Importantly, there is much more work to do regarding ways
to support clinical staff regarding ways to support clinical staff facing
not only the increasing external pressures but the complex everyday
clinical ethical issues, and this is the future of my own work. How-
ever, it is important that we try to transform the nursing narrative,
away from the metanarrative of powerless, suffering victims (Paley,
2004), and embrace a new narrative for nursing.
In a recent study reported in Peden-McAlpine, Liaschenko,
Traudt, and Gilmore-Szott (2015) and Traudt, Liaschenko, and
Peden-McAlpine (2016), 19 experienced critical care nurses were
interviewed who self-identified as skilled and comfortable during
end-of-life care, MD did not arise as a theme. This was surprising
considering that many studies have found that end-of-life care and
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments provides the kind of moral
events that often lead to experiences of MD. Instead of discussing
their experiences of MD, the nurses in Traudt et al. (2016), who had
an average of 17 years critical care experience, reported feeling a
strong sense of moral agency, felt accountable for their actions, pos-
sessed “moral imagination” (meaning they could empathise and
appreciate the values of others) and perceived a “moral community”
in which they viewed themselves as an integral part of the decision-
making process. The authors highlighted how the nurses in this
study seemed to feel able to navigate ethically difficult scenarios.
Commenting on this study, Rushton and Carse (2016) applaud the
changing MD narrative, away from the powerlessness nurse to one
in which the nurse is able to thrive within a moral community, bol-
stered by ethical competency, likely authority and able to enact their
moral agency. Whilst we continue to implement, measure and assess
the effectiveness of interventions that might mitigate the negative
consequences of MD, I call on nurses to continue the fight against
this continued narrative of powerlessness and instead embrace the
power they do have to engage in moral reflection and debate.
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